The United States must disassociate itself from the Pakistani President without rupturing its relationship with the Pakistani military.
Thursday, Pakistan’s Supreme Court dismissed the last in a series of objections to the reelection of President Perez Musharraf. Prior to the Court’s ruling, which entitles Musharraf to officially begin his second presidential term, the President went to great lengths to retain his authority: November 3, Musharraf declared emergency rule, suspended the constitution, and dismissed the Supreme Court. At issue was Musharraf’s refusal to abide by the Pakistani constitution, which prohibits the president from pursuing a second term while in command of the military; Musharraf refused to relinquish his command over Pakistan’s military prior to the presidential elections. Despite the President’s dual titles, elections were held in October, as scheduled, but following Musharraf’s reelection, opposition parties challenged the contest’s constitutionality. Faced with the likelihood of an unfavorable Supreme Court ruling, Musharraf declared a state of emergency and suspended the Court. Eventually, the Court was allowed to reconvene, but only after Musharraf replaced dissenting Justices; the Court’s pro-Musharraf sentiments were displayed Thursday.
Musharraf’s dictatorial handling of the constitutional crisis is not satisfying Pakistanis, 70 percent of whom want the President out. This is the nightmare scenario for the Bush administration, to which the Pakistani President has been an important ally, particularly with respect to counterterrorism. Musharraf’s antics are making a mockery of democracy and if Washington continues to support this dictator it will surely exacerbate anti-Americanism in the region. The Bush administration must disassociate itself from Musharraf, but it cannot jeopardize its relationship with the Pakistani military – to which the U.S. has provided unprecedented financing and expertise since 9/11.
The military is Pakistan’s only well-organized civil institution and the central policymaking body. Musharraf is less a dictator than a representative of the military dictatorship and he can be replaced. Pakistan’s military depends heavily on American subsidies and the U.S. should use its considerable leverage to present the military with two choices: replace Musharraf and embrace multilateral governance with American support or oversee a police state without support. The military must be convinced to engage major opposition politicians, especially former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The opposition is unlikely to cooperate with Musharraf because his unpopularity may be contagious, but they do understand that the military will be part of any coalition government. [1]
Musharraf seized power in 1999 in a bloodless coup and he must be aware of his own vulnerability; he may be preparing to defend his presidency in the event of a coup attempt. Because Pakistan possesses a sizable nuclear arsenal, it is critical that the U.S. not allow the Pakistani military to become factionalized; this means that any military coup must be prenegotiated with Musharraf and exected peacefully. Furthermore, because there are officials within Pakistan’s military bureaucracy tied to Afghan Jihadists, the U.S. must be allowed to oversee the selection of Pakistan’s next military leader.
Musharraf has promised to resign from his position atop the military administration after officially beginning his presidential term. The genuineness of his pledge is unknowable, but even this concession would be unsatisfactory. Pakistanis deserve better and if Pakistan’s military refuses to replace Musharraf, the opposition will become insurmountable.
There are no easy solutions in Pakistan, but by supporting a nonviolent regime change, the U.S. will encourage its ally, the Pakistani military, to embrace political pluralism.
[1] Musharraf has scheduled parliamentary elections for January 8, but opposition parties may boycott.
