The death of Latin America's most polarizing leader will provide Washington with an opportunity to abandon policies which have fueled mutual animus for decades.
July 31, 2006, prior to undergoing a series of intestinal surgeries, Cuban President Fidel Castro officially delegated provisional authority over Cuba’s affairs to his 75 year old brother Raul and a small contingent of senior party members. Although Castro is reportedly recovering, the episode continues to stir debate over the island’s future. Of particular consequence will be the United States government’s reaction to Castro’s imminent passing. The normalization of relations between the adversarial neighbors is long overdue. Castro’s death will provide politicians in both countries with the best opportunity to alleviate hostilities since the Berlin Wall's demolition.
In the years subsequent to the Cold War, a series of controversial economic sanctions against Cuba, instituted by the Bush and Clinton administrations, reinforced existing trade embargos. Despite the sanctioning, the first Bush administration ceased covert operations against the Castro regime and the Clinton administration cooperated with Cuban Officials on some issues, agreeing to grant 20,000 visas annually to Cuban migrants and ease travel restrictions. However, what modest progress Clinton accomplished was undone in 1996, when Cuba’s military grounded two planes in Cuban airspace flown by a Cuban American exile group called Brothers to the Rescue. American officials reacted swiftly, passing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which further isolated Cuba. Cooperative measures in the ensuing years were repeatedly undermined, most notably in 2000 by Elian Gonzalez’s arrival in Southern Florida. Initially, the second Bush administration adopted hostile rhetoric with regards to Castro’s government (in large part, an attempt to attract the support of Cuban Americans prior to the 2000 presidential election). However, the administration’s preoccupations in the Islamic World have marginalized Cuba’s relative importance.
Due in large part to the current resurgence of anti-Americanism in Latin America, the status quo is unsustainable. Numerous options will become available to the U.S. following Castro’s death, but only economic normalization is desirable and feasible. Although regime change has often been a central component in Washington’s Cuba policy, few Americans would support military incursion and President Bush’s appetite for nation building has presumably soured considerably. Furthermore, such an operation would surely be resisted by the Cuban military as well as nationalist insurgents. Attacks on U.S. soil would probably ensue considering Cuba’s proximity (approximately 90 miles from Southern Florida). Although preferable to conventional warfare, covert operations in Cuba have a history of failure. Nor have nonmilitary attempts to undermine the Castro administration been particularly successful. Today, the U.S. spends approximately 35 million dollars annually supporting oppositionists and disseminating propaganda; these initiatives have mostly been ineffective and often counterproductive.
Economic normalization would facilitate strategic cooperation and assuage anti-Americanism across Latin America (particularly in Cuba). The U.S. should not abandon democracy promotion, but democratic reform must be encouraged diplomatically. Although Cuba will not become a multiparty democracy overnight, access to American tourists and consumers might persuade Castro’s successors, none of whom are likely to approach Fidel in terms of popularity.
Following Castro’s death, the U.S. should encourage Cuba to cooperate on a number of mutually relevant regional issues, most notably drug-trafficking, ethanol production and environmental concerns. Washington should encourage cooperation by taking preliminary steps toward lifting the trade embargo; easing travel restrictions and dissuading antagonistic rhetoric would be particularly constructive.
The death of Latin America’s most polarizing leader will provide Washington with an opportunity to abandon policies which have fueled mutual animus for decades. Americans throughout the Western Hemisphere desire a more sensible approach to Cuba, to which the embargos are a major impediment. In order to accommodate their constituents, administrators in the U.S. and Cuba must look past Fidel and to the future.
J.G.
Sources:
Sweig, Julia E. 'Fidel's Final Victory'. Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007
'Contemplating Cuba After Fidel'. CBC News, August 2, 2006
